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BANKS AND BANKING-PRIVILEGE OF BANK TO SET OFF UNmATURED
CLAIMs AGAINST DnposTS.-The plaintiff's intestate died April 16, leaving
$501.20 on deposit in the defendant bank. He and X were jointly responsible
on a $100 note due May 13. On May 11 the plaintiff sought to withdraw
the deposit, making a sufficient demand. The defendant refused to permit
this until the note should be paid. Thereupon the plaintiff brought suit.
Judgment was given for the plaintiff on the ground that the death of the
depositor gave the bank no right to set off an unmatured claim. Held, on
rehearing, that the judgment be affirmed. Citizens Bank and Trust Co. v.
Turner, 122 So. 311 (Ala. 1929), certiorari denied, 122 So. 312 (1929).
Where a depositor has been adjudicated a bankrupt; § 68 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act [30 STAT. 565 (1898), 11 U. S. C. § 108 (1926)] has been con-
strued to permit a bank to set off unmatured claims against deposits. Frank
v. Mercantile Nat. Bank, 182 N. Y. 264, 74 N. E. 841 (1905). Where the
basis for the claim of a set-off is the appointment of a receiver to take over
the depositor's business, there is a conflict in the decisions. Harter Bank
v. Inglis, 6 F. (2d) 841 (C. C. A. 6th, 1925), certiorwi denied, 269 U. S.
577, 46 Sup. Ct. 103 (1925) (set-off allowed); Kurtz v. County Bank of
Clearfield, 288 Pa. 472, 136 Atl. 789 (1927) (set-off disallowed). A set-off
has been allowed against the estate of a decedent where it has been ad-
judged insolvent. Sullivan v. Merchants' Bank, 108 Conn. 497, 144 Atl. 34
(1928). And the same is true where the administrator has admitted in
the pleadings that the estate is insolvent. Pendleton v. Hellman Commer-
cial Trust and Savings Bank, 58 Cal. App. 448, 208 Pac. 702 (1922). But
even a well founded belief that a depositor, who is indebted to the bank,
is insolvent will not of itself justify a bank in refusing to honor checks
drawn on his account. Meinhart v. Farmers State Bank, 124 Kan. 333, 259
Pac. 698 (1927). But cf. Parker v. First Nat. Bank, 96 Okla. 70, 220 Pac.
39 (1923). In garnishment proceedings, however, a bank may set off unma-
tured claims against a depositor who is in fact insolvent but has not yet been
officially so declared. Wunderlich v. Merchants' Nat. Bank, 109 Minn. 468,
124 N. W. 223 (1910). But such set-off may not be made merely becauso
the depositor is a non-resident. Stockyards Nat. Bank. v. Presnall, 109 Tex.
32, 194 S. W. 384 (1917). A recent statute in New York has seemingly
conferred the right of set off where the funds on deposit have been attached
as well as where there has been an adjudication in bankruptcy or an assign-
ment for the benefit of creditors. N. Y. Laws 1927, c. 697. It must be
borne in mind that, where the depositor is insolvent, the bank can realize
the full amount of its claim only if it is allowed a right of set-off. In the
instant case there was no showing that the estate was insolvent or that the
bank's claim would not eventually be paid in full. There was, therefore,
no reason for allowing a set-off, since the only effect would be to permit the
bank to realize on the claim before its maturity. Cf. Jordan v. Nat. Shoo
& Leather Bank, 74 N. Y. 467 (1878). Even had the case been one where
a set-off would otherwise have been allowed, the court might have refused
to permit this without a showing that the other joint obligor was insolvent.
Cf. Macon Nat. Bank v. Smith, 149 S. E. 172 (Ga. 1929).
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BIS AND NoTES-RECVERY BY DRAwE OF PAYMENTS MADE: TO HOLDER
OF CHECK BEARING FORGED INDORSEuNT.-P, having a power of attorney
to receive a United States Government tax refund check on behalf of M,
exceeded his authority and indorsed the check. A subsequent indorser
cashed the check with the defendant bank which then collected the amount
from the government. The government brought suit to recover the sum so
paid. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. Held, that the
motion be granted. The plaintiffs have not shown title to the check, and
there may be equitable defenses available to the defendant in case of suit
by the payee. United States v. Bank of Concy Island, 36 F. (2d) 829 (E.
D. N. Y. 1929).
The decision in the instant case appears to be out of line with the long
established rule that in a case involving forgery of the payee's indorsement
the risk of loss, as between the drawee and the presenting party, is borne
by the latter. White v. Continental National Bank, 64 N. Y. 316 (1876);
New York produce Exchange Bank v. Twelfth Ward Bank, 134 App. Div.
953, 119 N. Y. Supp. 988 (1st Dep't 1909) ; BRANNAN, THE NEGOTAILE IN-
STRUmENTS LAw (1926) 569 et seq. The contrary obtains in general where
the forgery is of the drawer's signature. Cloeter Nat. v. Federal Reorvc
Bank, 285 Fed. 138 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922) ; Ames, The Doctrine of Price . Nal
(1891) 4 HARv. L. REv. 297; BRANNAN, op. cit. supra at 556 et scq. The
action in the instant case is based on mistake of fact and is not brought
on the check. Cf. American Exchange Bank; v. Yorktillc Banl, 122 Llise.
616, 204 N. Y. Supp. 621 (Sup. Ct. 1924). The defendant's indorsement
apparently does not include any warranty to the drawee. First National
Bank of Portland v. United States Bank of Portland, 100 Ore. 264, 197 Paa.
547 (1921). It has been suggested, however, that the indorsement contract
should be broadened to include warranty of title to the drawee. See Turner,
Bank Collections (1930) 39 YAL L. J. 468, n. 40. On either theory, ho-
ever, the plaintiff's title to the check or lack of it would not appear to be
material. As to the equitable defense referred to, it seems that if some
claim which the defendant might have against the payee might be endan-
gered by the present action, such claim at most should be held to constitute
matter of defense or ground for permitting the defendant to bring in the
payee as a party, rather than to support the dismissal of the complaint.
Cf. Newall v. Longacre Ban, 248 N. Y. 252, 162 N. E. 23 (1928) (burden
was on collecting bank to protect itself in case of future litigation, by mnl,-
ing payee without consideration of fraudulently uttered checks a party to
action by the drawee for return of the proceeds).
CoNFLICT op LAwS-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE--BURiDEN OF P00F.,-Tho
plaintiff was injured in Ontario while in the employ of the defendant rail-
way, a New York corporation. Suit was brought in New York, a claim of
negligence being based on the defendant's violation of an Ontario statute.
In order to give effect to the Ontario Contributory Negligence Act, which
permits a negligent plaintiff to recover if the defendant's negligence ex-
ceeds his own, the trial court charged that the burden of proving contribu-
tory negligence was upon the defendant, in accordance with the Ontario
rule. Under the New York "local" rule, contributory negligence would
have barred any recovery and the burden woulid have been on the plaintiff
to prove freedom from contributory negligence. The plaintiff was found
contributorily negligent to a degree of ten per cent, and judgment was
rendered for him for ninety per cent of the loss. Held, on appeal, that the
judgment be affirmed. Fitzpatrick v. International Ry., 252 N. Y. 127, 169
N. E. 112 (1929).
The effect of the plaintiff's contributory negligence upoir his recovery is
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generally governed by the lex loci delicti. Caine v. St. Louis & San Fran-
cisco R. R., 209 Ala. 181, 95 So. 876 (1923); Miss[ouri Pacific Ry. v. Coca-
Cola Bottling Co., 154 Ark. 413, 242 S. W. 813 (1922) ; cf. Bridgor v. Ashe-
ville & Spartanburg R. R., 27 S. C. 456, 3 S. E. 860 (1887) (age at which
infant is chargeable with negligence determined by lex loci delicti). Contra:
Johnson v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 91 Iowa 248, 59 N. W. 66 (1894). The
common law rule that contributory negligence bars recovery is often modi-
fied by statutes enacting a rule of comparative negligence. See 1 SuuAnREIAN
AND REDFIELD, NEGLIGENCE (6th ed. 1913) §§ 102, 103. Such statutes are not
ordinarily considered inconsistent with public policy so as to be unenforce-
able in a foreign forum in which suit is brought. Keane Wonder Mining
Go. v. Cunningham, 222 Fed. 821 (C. C. A. 9th, 1915). Contra: Johnson v.
Chicago & N. W. Ry., supra. Nor are they deemed "penal" so as to be
unenforceable in another state See Miller v. Kansas City Western R. R.,
180 Mo. App. 371, 377, 168 S. W. 336, 338 (1914). In matters of "proced-
ure," the lex fori is said to govern. But there is confusion as to what con-
stitutes a matter of "procedure" for this purpose. Thus, statutory provi-
sions requiring that the issue of contributory negligence be submitted to
the jury have received conflicting interpretations. Cf. Colucci V. Lehigh
Valley R. R., 121 Misc. 758, 202 N. Y. Supp. 717 (Sup. Ct. 1923) (such a
provision of the lex loci delicti disregarded); Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. V.
Spencer, 20 F. (2d) 714 (C. C. A. 9th, 1927) (similar statute of the lex
fori rejected and the lex loci applied); (1928) 26 MICH. L. Rzv. 571;
(1927) 41 HARv. L. REv. 254; Note (1928) 12 MINN. L. REv. 263. In these
cases no controversy seems to have arisen as to the conflict of laws in re-
spect to the burden of proof (either the risk of non-persuasion or the bur-
den of going forward). 'The requirement that the plaintiff show initially
that he is free from fault has been held to be a condition upon the right.
Southern Ry. v. Robertson, 7 Ga. App. 154, 66 S. E. 535 (1909) ; RESTATE-
MENT OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (Am L. Inst. 1929) § 629b. But cf. ibid.
§ 629a. The burden of proof on any issue, however, is generally said to be
governed by the lex fori, as it is a question of evidence. Levy v. Steiger,
233 Mass. 600, 124 N. E. 477 (1919) ; GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1927)
167. But of. Conto-at Vt. Ry. v. White, 238 U. S. 507, 35 Sup. Ct. 865
(1915) ; Note (1915) 29 HARv. L. REv. 95; Barnet v. N. Y. Central & H. R.
R. R., 222 N. Y. 195, 118 N. E. 625 (1918); Note (1918) 18 CoL. L. Rv.
354. But where, as in the instant case, the rule of the forum as to the bur-
den of proof of an issue has been developed in conjunction with a rule
as to the effect of such issue, which effect differs materially from the
applicable rule of the lex loci delicti, it seems reasonable to apply the lte
loci delicti also to the burden of proof.
CORPORATIONS-CONTRACT OF CORPORATION TO PURCHASE ITS OWN
SHARES--REQUIREMENT THAT PAYMENT BE MADE OUT OF "SunLus."-Tho
X corporation entered into a contract to purchase shares held by the plain-
tiff in the corporation for a named sum payable in instalments. At the
time the corporation had a surplus in excess of the purchase price of the
shares. The plaintiff surrendered his certificates and received the payments
which became due. Eight years later the corporation suffered reverses and
transferred all of its assets to a creditors' committee. By agreement these
assets were distributed in satisfaction of all claims except that of the plain-
tiff for the balance due on the purchase contract and those of officers for
salaries which had accrued subsequent to the execution of the contract. It
was stipulated that these claims were to be litigated to establish whether
the vendor should share pro rata with or come in after the officers as to
the balance of the assets. The lower court ruled that the plaintiff should
RECENT CASE NOTES
share pro rata with the officers. Held, on appeal, that the judgment be
affirmed. Cross v. Beguelin, 252 N. Y. 262, 169 N. E. 378 (1929).
The power of a corporatiin to purchase its own shares is generally said
to be limited by the requirement that such a purchase must be made in good
faith and out of corporate surplus. 2 CooK, CoRPORATIONS (8th ed. 1923)
1040. Where the rights of creditors are not involved, however, some courts
have held that the corporation could not assert the absence of a "surplus"
either for the purpose of resisting the claim of the vendor for payment or
of recovering payments already made. Davies v. Montana Auto Financo
Corp., 284 Fac. 267 (Mont. 1930) (suit by vendor); O'Brien Mercantile Co.
v. Bay Lake Fruit Growers' Ass'2z, 226 N. W. 513 (Minn. 1929) (same);
Otsego Paper Stock Co. v. Slosberg, 230 Mich. 260, 202 N. W. 991 (1925)
(suit by corporation) ; cf. Topken, Loring and Schwartz, Inc. v. Schwartz,
249 N. Y. 206, 163 N. E. 735 (1928) (corporation could not enforce repur-
chase contract for lack of mutuality since, if there were creditors and no
surplus, it -would not be bound). Contra: Duddy-Robinson Co. v. Taylor,
137 Wash. 304, 242 Pac. 21 (1926) (suit by corporation allowed on grounds
of public welfare); cf. Darnell-Love Lumber Co. v. Wiggs, 144 Tenn. 113,
230 S. W. 391 (1921) (on similar grounds vendor permitted to disaffirm pur-
chase agreement, restoring amount paid him and receiving back the shares).
It is well settled that creditors existing at the time of the making of the pur-
chase agreement may, on the ground of lack of "surplus," resist the claim of
the vendor or recover payments already made to him. Keith v. Kilmcr, 261
Fed. 733 (C. C. A. 1st, 1919) ; Buck v. Ross, 68 Conn. 29, 35 Atl. 763 (1896).
But there is a diversity of opinion as to whether subsequent creditors may so
avoid the purchase agreement. Under the trust fund theory it has been
argued that subsequent creditors are entitled to rely upon the capital of the
corporation remaining intact and hence that they are to be protected. Clark
v. E. C. Clark Machine Co., 151 Mich. 416, 115 N. W. 416 (1908) (mort-
gage given to secure purchase price of shares not enforceable as against
subsequent creditors); Union Trust Co. v. Anzery, 67 Wash. 1, 120 Pac. 539
(1912) (in order to recover amounts paid, trustee in bankruptcy need not
allege that there were Lxisting creditors since subsequent creditors are
equally entitled to redress). In a jurisdiction expressly repudiating the
trust fund theory, the same result has been reached on the basis of construc-
tive fraud as to subsequent creditors. Atlanta and WahL'orth Butter and
Cheese Ass'n. v. Smith, 141 Wis. 377, 123 N. Mr. 106 (1909) ; cf. Coleman v.
Tepel, 230 Fed. 63 (C. C. A. 3d, 1916). In other cases the result has been
made to depend upon notice to the subsequent creditor. First Trust Co. v.
Illinois Cent. R. R., 256 Fed. 830 (C. C. A. 8th, 1919) (subsequent creditors
with notice cannot resist claim of vendor for purchase price). The existence
of a "surplus" at the time the purchase agreement was entered into seems
to be regarded as immaterial if it is shown that no "surplus" existed at the
time payment was to be made. In re Fechheimer FiOhel Co., 212 Fed. 357
(C. C. A. 2d, 1914) ; In re O'Gara and Maguire, Inc., 259 Fed. 935 (D. N.
J. 1919); (1914) 14 COL. L. REV. 451; Note (1914) 27 Lv. L. REv. '47;
cf. Wormser, The Power of a Corporation to Acquire Its Own Stocl (1915)
24 YALE L. J. 177, 186. But part payments, valid when made, cannot be
subsequently recovered. Sanford v. First National Ban!: of Marysville, 238
Fed. 298 (C. C. A. 8th, 1916). One may dissent from the proposition that
subsequent insolvency should avoid a purchase contract valid when made.
But in the instant case, where the only question before the court was whether
the vendor should share equally with the officers or after them, the result
can hardly be criticized.
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CORPORATION--FAiULRE TO CoMPY WITH CONDITIONS OF DOING BUSI-
NESS WITHIN STATE-SuIT ON CONTRACT MADE WITHOUT STATE.-The plain-
tiff, a foreign corporation, brought a bill in a Federal District Court of
Arkansas to foreclose a mechanic's lien arising out of a building contract
made by the parties in Tennessee. The plaintiff had not complied with an
Arkansas statute requiring a foreign corporation to file a copy of its articles
of incorporation and to appoint a resident agent as conditions precedent to
the right to transact business in the state. [ARK. DIG. STAT. (Crawford &
Moses, 1921) § 1832] For non-compliance the statute provided a fine and
"as an additional penalty" that the foreign corporation "cannot make any
contract in this state which can be enforced by it either in law or in equity."
The district court gave judgment for the plaintiff. Held, on appeal, that
the judgment be affirmed. Brace v. Ganger-Korsmo Construction Co., 36 F.
(2d) 661 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929).
Statutes similar to that in the instant case are generally construed as
providing that contracts of non-complying foreign corporations are either
"void" or "unenforceable." BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS (1928) § 289; Note
(1925) 25 COL. L. REv. 806; Note (1929) 14 IowA L. REv. 372. Where the
term "void" is used, the contract cannot be enforced by the corporation in
any jurisdiction. Thomas v. Birmingham Power Co., 195 Fed. 340 (N. D.
Ala. 1912); Co. of Cullinan v. Vincennes Bridge Co., 251 Fed. 473 (C. C. A.
5th, 1918); (1928) 26 MICH. L. REv. 693. It has been held, however, that the
corporation may recover in an action for money had and received despite
the fact that the contract was called "void." Lasswell Land & Lumber Co.
v. Lee Wilson & Co., 236 Fed. 322 (C. C. A. 8th, 1916). But cf. Thomas w.
Birmingham Power Co., supra. And a corporation in such a situation has
not been precluded from maintaining a tort action to recover goods delivered
to another under such a contract. United Shoe Machinery Co. v. Ramlosc,
231 Mo. 508, 172 S. W. 1133 (1910); Capitol Lumber Co. v. Mullinix, 208
Ala. 266, 94 So. 88 (1922). But cf. Cable Co. v. Estes, 206 Ala. 95, 89 So. 372
(1921). Nor is a bona fide purchaser of a negotiable instrument from such
a corporation unable to sue on the instrument though it arose out of a
"void" transaction. Commercial National Bank v. Jordan, 71 Fla. 566, 71
So. 760 (1916); Finseth v. Scherer, 138 Minn. 355, 165 N. W. 124
(1917); cf. Citizens' Natiomial Bank v. Bucheit, 14 Ala. App. 511, 71
So. 82 (1916). Contra: Dean v. Coldwell, 141 Ark. 38, 216 S. W. 31 (1919).
Where the statute merely declares the contract to be "unenforceable," a
contract made within the state can genarally be enforced by the corpora-
tion in other jurisdictions. Allegheny Co. v. Allen, 69 N. J. L. 270, 55 Atl.
724 (1903); David Lupton's Sons v. Auto Club of America, 225 U. S. 480,
32 Sup. Ct. 711 (1911). And even within the state where the contract is
made the corporation has been allowed to secure a judgment by way of
counterclaim. Alring v. N. E. Quartz & Spar Co., 66 App. Div. 473, 73
N. Y. Supp. 347 (1st Dep't 1901), aff'd, 174 N. Y. 536, 66 N. E. 1110 (1903).
If the contract is entered into in another state a corporation can generally
still sue in the state where it has not complied with the statute if the pro-
hibition extends only to contracts made "in this state." Bettilyou Home
Builders Co. v. Philbrick, 31 Idaho 724, 175 Pac. 758 (1918); Westerlin &
Campbell Co. v. Detroit Mill Co., 233 Mich. 384, 206 N. W. 371 (1925). But
ef. In 'e Springfield Realty Co., 257 Fed. 785 (E. D. Mich. 1919). In the
instant case, however, the court preferred to rest its decision on the ground
that the statute is a purely "procedural" one and as such has no application
in the federal courts. Cf. Ockenfels v. Boyd, 297 Fed. 614 (C. C. A. 8th,




CoRPoRATIoNs-Pun-msITvE RIGHTS-SHARES Cx.EED To AccoMpiasa
DIEaEu-The defendant corporation, by a two-thirds vote of its share-
holders, amended its charter to authorize the creation of additional voting
shares for the purpose of exchanging such shares for the shares of a cor-
poration with which the defendant proposed to merge. A contemporaneous
amendment was adopted which denied to the shareholders of the defendant
preferential subscription rights in the shares created to accomplish the
merger. The plaintiffs, who had voted against these amendments, brought
suit to restrain the proposed issue of shares on the ground that they had
a prior right to purchase a proportionate share of such new issue. The
lower court dismissed the bill. Held, on appeal, that the decree be affirmed.
Thorn v. Baltimore Trust Co., 148 Atl. 234 (111d. 1930).
It is generally agreed that a voting shareholder, in order to protect his
interest in the control of the corporation, may restrain the creation of addi-
tional voting shares unless he has been offered an opportunity to purchase
a proportionate number thereof. Stokcs v. Continental T-ust Co., 186 N. Y.
285, 78 N. E. 1090 (1906) ; RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF BUSINESS Asso-
CIATIONS (Am. L. Inst. 1928) § 12 (2); Frey, Sharcholders' Pre-emptive
Rights (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 563; cf. M orawetz, Pre-enptive Right of
Shareholders (1928) 42 HARv. L. R1EV. 186. An exception to this
rule has been made where the shares in controversy were =created to pur-
chase property and not to be sold for cash. Meredith v. New Jersey Iron
& Zinc Co., 55 N. J. Eq. 211, 37 Atl. 539 (1897) ; see Bonnett v. First Nat
Bank, 24 Tex. Civ. App. 613, 615, 60 S. W. 325, 326 (1900); Stokes v. Con-
tinental Trust Co., supra at 299, 78 N. E. at 1094. This exception has been
severely criticized. Frey, op. cit. supra at 579; Morawetz, op. cit. upra at
196. But cf. Drinker, Pre-emnpt, e Rights of Shareholders (1930) 43 HAnv.
L. Rsv. 586. The instant court based its decision on the theory that the
"'pre-emptive right" exists only when it can be exercised consistently with
the object which the disposition of the additional shares is designed to accom-
plish. Under such a theory the exception noted above would apply only to
the case where shares are created in order to acquire unique property with
which the owner will not part except in return for voting shares. Query
as to the validity of the amendment denying preferential subscription rights
had the court decided that shares created for property were not ipso facto
excepted from the operation of the "pre-emptive right" rule.
CRIMINAL LAW-ILLEGAL IMPORTATION OF AxmNs.-The defendants were
indicted for "bringing in," "landing," and "conspiring to bring in and land"
aliens in the United States in violation of § 8 of the Immigration Act of
1917 [39 STAT. 880 (1917), 8 U. S. C. § 144 (1926)], which provides that
"Any person . . . who shall bring into or land in the United States . . .
any alien... shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof
shall be punished by a fine not exceeding -2000 and by imprisonment for
a term not exceeding five years for each and every alien so landed or
brought in." They were found guilty on all three counts and ten distinct
sentences of a year and a day, the lowest sentence possible, were imposed on
each of the first two counts, the jury having found that they had "brought
in" and "landed" ten aliens. Held, on appeal (one judge dissenting in
part), that the cases be remanded to the lower court for resentence on the
two counts, on the ground, inter alia, that the court erred in imposing ten
distinct sentences, since each count charged only one offence, though the
minimum penalty determined upon must be multiplied by the number of
aliens "landed" or "brought in." Serentino v. United States, 36 F. (2d) 871
(C. C. A. 1st, 1930).
Under § 10 of the Immigration Act of 1917 [39 STAT. 881 (1917), 8 U. S.
1930]
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C. § 146 (1926)], which imposes a penalty of $1000 on the owner, master
etc. of any vessel bringing an alien into the United States who does not
prevent his unlawful landing, which sum is to be collected by a libel against
the boat, it has been held that the full penalty can be collected for every
alien who unlawfully lands. United States v. The Coamo, 267 U. S. 220,
45 Sup. Ct. 237 (1925). And under § 5 of the Immigration Act of 1907
[34 STAT. 900 (1907)], which made it a misdemeanor punishable by a pen-
alty of $1000 to solicit or assist in the importation of contract laborers, and
expressly permitted a separate suit for each alien imported, it has been held
that the statutory penalty multiplied by the number of aliens can be re-
covered in a single action. Grant Bros. v. United States, 232 U. S. 647,
34 Sup. Ct. 452 (1914) ; cf. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. United States, 231 U.
S. 112, 34 Sup. Ct. 26 (1913) ; The Kathlambra, 18 F. (2d) 113 (E. D. N.
Y. 1926). But where only one letter was sent and two laborers entered as
a result, the recovery of a double penalty was not permitted. United States
v. International Silver Co., 255 Fed. 694 (D. Conn. 1919). In the foregoing
cases, however, the suit to recover the penalty was in the nature of a civil
action. Grant Bros. v. United States, supra. But ef. United States v. Ste-
venson, 215 U. S. 190, 30 Sup. Ct. 35 (1909) (indictment would also lie).
In the instant case the prosecution is criminal and the statute calls for im-
prisonment as well as a fine. As pointed out in the dissenting opinion, this
makes it possible, on the facts of the instant case, to impose a sentence of
100 years for what the statute expressly makes only a misdemeanor. This
construction puts an unreasonable amount of power in the hands of the trial
judge and it may well be doubted whether it carries out the intention of the
legislature. Furthermore, the decision of the court that "landing" and
"bringing in" constitute two separate offenses appears to be indefensible.
It has been held that one bringing an alien into the territorial waters of
the United States is guilty of a violation of this act. Middleton v. United
States, 32 F. (2d) 239 (C. C. A. 5th, 1929). But it does not follow that,
had the defendant in that case succeeded in landing the aliens, he should
have been subjected to a double prosecution. Query as to whether acqittal
on a charge of "bringing in" would not be a defence to a subsequent charge
of "landing" based on the same facts.
INSURANCF,-DENIAL OF RESPONSIBILITY ON STATED GROUNDS AS WAIVER
OF OTHER DEFENSES.-After the death of the insured, a letter from the in-
surer to the beneficiary denied responsibility on a life insurance policy
because of false representations in the application. In a suit thereafter
brought on the policy, the insurer offered the defense of nonpayment of pre-
miums. The defense was admitted and judgment awarded to the beneficiary
merely for the amount of premiums received by the company. Held, on ap-
peal by the beneficiary, that judgment be reversed, since the statement of
one ground of forfeiture by the insurer waived all other known defenses.
Cummins v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 148 At]. 484 (Vt. 1930).
A general denial of responsibility by the insurer without stating any
reasons therefor waives no other grounds of forfeiture than that of non-
compliance with executory conditions of the policy. Cronin v. Fire Ass'n of
Phila., 119 Mich. 74, 77 N. W. 648 (1898); Becker v. Interstate Business
Men etc., 265 Fed. 508 (C. C. A. 8th, 1920) (statement that "the loss is not
covered by the policy" operates as general disclaimer of all responsibility,
and not merely as disclaimer on special ground that the loss is within the
"excepted risks" clause). And repudiation of responsibility for specified
reasons relieves the insured of the necessity of complying with executory
conditions. Watson v. Ocean Accident and Guarantee Corp., 28 Ariz. 573,
238 Pac. 338 (1925); St. Louis Beef Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 201
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U. S. 173, 26 Sup. Ct. 400 (1906). But cf. Callen v. Massachusetts Protec-
tive Ass'n, 24 F. (2d) 694 (C. C. C. 8th, 1928). Some courts have extended
the latter rule, so that if the insurer states one or more specified reasons
for denying responsibility under a policy, it is thereby held to waive all
other known grounds of forfeiture. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Fletcher Amer.
Nat. Bank, 84 Ind. App. 563, 150 N. E. 825 (1925) ; Cohen v. London Guar-
antee & Accident Co., 225 N. W. 549 (Mlich. 1929); 5 COOLnY, Brwiz ON
INsURANcE (2d ed. 1927) 4319. Contra: Schaeffer v. National Surety Co.,
292 Pa. 81, 140 At. 621 (1928). There has also been some application of
this rule in cases not involving insurance law. Powers v. Bolhslav, 84 Neb.
179, 120 N. W. 942, (1909) (suit for real estate broker's commissions);
Railway Co. v. McCarthy, 96 U. S. 258 (1877). A few courts have refused
to apply such a doctrine unless the unassigned defenses could have been
remedied or obviated had the insured known the insurer intended to rely
on them. Taylor & Baldwin Co. v. Norhiwestern Fire Ins. Co., 18 N. D.
343, 122 N. W. 396 (1909); ef. Welsh v. London As"ur. Corp., 151 Pa. 607,
25 Atl. 142 (1892); Note (1911) 20 ANN. CAS. 438. There is a possibility
that even the addition of a non-waiver agreement may not prevent the oper-
ation of a waiver as to unstated defenses where responsibility is denied on
other grounds. Cf. Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 108 Fed. 497
(C. C. A. 5th, 1901). But cf. Oreustein v. Star Ins. Co., 10 F. (2d) 754
(C. C. A. 4th, 1926); see (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 424. An abhorrence of for-
feitures has often influenced courts readily to construe acts of insurance
companies as constituting waivers or estoppels. But where the ground of
defense not asserted is one which could not have been cured at the time the
other defense was asserted (as in the instant case it was then too late to
pay the premiums), there seems to be little reason for considering such a
defense as waived. Construing such acts as waivers virtually allows the
insured "to construct a cause of action out of the expense of the lawsuit
in which he establishes no right of action." See RICnArnS, INsuUANcc (2d
ed. 1901) 85.
INSURANCE-REFORMATION OF POLICy-LACITES AS B, .- In a $10,000
life insurance policy issued to the defendant by the plaintiff's predecessor,
a cash surrender value of $10,000 was inserted by mistake instead of the
usual amount of $3,040. The defendant was notified of this error within
two months but declined to surrender the policy for correction. The regu-
lar premiums having been tendered and accepted each year the defendant
twenty years later demanded the $10,000 cash surrender value, whereupon
the plaintiff filed a bill in equity to reform the policy. The defenses in-
cluded absence of mutual mistake and laches. The trial court found there
was not sufficient evidence of mutual mistake to justify reforming the policy,
and that in any event the twenty years delay barred the plaintiff. Held, on
appeal, that the plaintiff was not barred by laches where the insured had
knowledge of the mistake. Judgment reversed. Colu~nbian Nat. Life IM.
Co. v. Black, 35 F. (2d) 571 (C. C. A. 10th, 1929).
An insurance policy failing, either through mutual mistake or fraud of
one party and mistake of the other, to ex\press the true intent of the parties
may be reformed. Sloss-Sheffield Steel Co. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 74 N. J.
Eq. 635, 70 Atl. 380 (1908); New York Life I2. Co. v. Gilbert, 215 Mo.
App. 201, 256 S. W. 148 (1923); POIEROY, Equry JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed.
1919) § 2096; (1929) 38 YAIn L. J. 682. The insertion of an erroneous
cash surrender value in a policy, as in the instant case, is a well-recognized
ground for such reformation. Henphill v. New York Life In. Co., 195 Ky.
783, 243 S. W. 1040 (1922) ; Hibbard v. North American Life Ins. Co., 192
Wis. 315, 212 N. W. 779 (1927). Reformation may be refused, however,
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if the party seeking it has allowed a considerable length of time to elapse
after he became aware of the mistake. Langdon v. Northwestern Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 190 N. Y. 188, 92 N. E. 440 (1910) (11 years) ; Graham v. Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 176 N. C. 313, 97 S. E. 6 (1918) (15 years). And the period
of delay may generally be computed from the time that the agent of the
insurer acquires knowledge of the mistake. National Union Ins. Co. W. John
Spry Lumber Co., 235 Ill. 98, 85 N. E. 256 (1908) ; Citizens Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Conowingo Bridge Co., 116 Md. 422, 82 Atl. 372 (1911). But how long a
delay by the insurer will constitute laches is always uncertain. Cf. Buck
v. Equitable Life Ins. Co., 96 Wash. 683, 165 Pac. 878 (1917) (recovery of
erroneous surrender value by insured refused although insurer had re-
mained inactive for 15 years); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Street, 265 S. W.
397 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) (reformation of mistaken amount in policy
barred by 14 years delay of insurer). Where there is no evidence of a
"change of position by either party, nor of any prejudice caused by the delay,
some courts hold that the requirement of promptness in bringing suit to
reform need not be so stringently enforced. Griswold v. Hazard, 141 U. S.
260, 11 Sup. Ct. 972 (1890) (reformation allowed after 13 years) ; Southern
Pao. Ry. v, Bogert, 250 U. S. 483, 39 Sup. Ct. 533 (1918) (mistake good
defense after 22 years). The payment of premiums in the instant case did
not constitute such a change of position since the insured was always en-
titled to the insurance for which he had paid, and, in spite of the plaintiff's
lack of diligence in bringing proceedings to correct the mistake, the result
seems desirable.
MASTER AND SERVANT-EMPLOYMENT IN VIOLATION OF CHwLD LABOR ACT
AS NEGLIGENCE PER SE.-A boy of fifteen sued to recover for injuries suf-
fered while in the employ of the defendant, who had not complied with a
statute requiring the employer of a minor between the ages of fourteen
and sixteen to obtain an employment certificate. [ILL. REV. STAT. (Cahill,
1927) c. 48, §§ 45-47] The lower court excluded evidence of contributory
negligence and lack of causal connection, on the ground that the illegal
employment constituted negligence per se. Held, on appeal, that the judg-
ment be affirmed. Gill v. Boston Store of Chicago, 168 N. E. 895 (Ill. 1929).
The mere employment of a child in violation of a child labor act is al-
most universally said to be negligence per se. See Terry Dairy Co. v. Nal-
ley, 146 Ark. 448, 455, 225 S. W. 887, 889 (1920) ; Note (1909) 20 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 881. But see Berdos v. Tremont Mills, 209 Mass. 489, 496,
95 N. E. 876, 878 (1911) ; (1926) 74 U. OF PA. L. REV. 852. The only nec-
essary result of such a premise is to preclude the defence that ordinary
care was used in determining the child's age. Blanton v. Kellioka Coal Co.,
192 Ky. 220, 232 S. W. 614 (1921); Knozville News Co. v. Spitzer, 279 S.
W. 1043 (Tenn. 1926). Contra: Ransom v. Nunnally Co., 26 Ga. App. 222,
105 S. E. 822 (1921) (showing of due diligence allowed as defence). It is,
however, generally held a bar to all defences ordinarily available to a neg-
ligent defendant. Thus, intentional misrepresentation of his age does not
prevent the child from recovering. Beauchamp v. Sturges & Burns Co., 250
Ill. 303, 95 N. E. 204 (1911) ; Krutlies v. Bulls Head Coal Co., 249 Pa. 162,
94 At. 459 (1915) ; Note L. R. A. 1915F 1082; see Note (1923) 23 A. L. R.
635 (concerning the right of a parent who acquiesced in the illegal hir-
ing). In case the employment was in violation of an unqualified statutory
prohibition the defence of contributory negligence is held to be unavailable
to the employer. Karpeles v. Heine, 227 N. Y. 74, 124 N. E. 101
(1919); Washburn v. Empire Printing Co., 249 S. W. 709 (Mo.
1923). Contra: Keen v. Crosby, 25 Ga. App. 459, 103 S. E. 850
(1920); Note (1920) 5 VA. L. REP. (N. S.) 368; Note (1921) 7 VA. L.
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REV. 378; Note (1926) 12 VA. L. REv. 503. And even where the statutory
prohibition is conditional upon obtaining a certificate, such as that in the
instant case, generally evidence of contributory negligence is, though it
would seem unwisely, barred. Miller Mfg. Co. v. Loving, 125 Va. 255, 99
S. E. 591 (1919). Contra: Buffum v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 273 S. W. 176
(Mo. 1925). Furthermore, the mere employment of a child without com-
pliance with the statutory condition is generally considered the "proximate
cause" of any subsequent injury. Buffum v. Woolworth; Washburn v. Em-
pire Printing Co., both supra; Bradas & Gheens v. Hawkins, 202 Ky. 136,
258 S. W. 969 (1924); Grand Rapids Trust Co. -v. Petrson Bevcrage Co.,
219 Mich. 208, 189 N. W. 186 (1922). Thus an insurer's responsibility has
been raised from such statutes; a violator is not only negligent per C) but
liable per se. See Washburn v. Empire Printing Co., supra at 711. Some
courts have required proof of causation, i.e., that the injury would have been
averted had there been compliance with the statute. Cox Cash Stores v.
Allen, 167 Ark. 364, 268 S. W. 361 (1925); Birmingham New- Co. v. An-
drews, 204 Ala. 649, 87 So. 168 (1920). Justification for the stricter rule,
however, may be found in its prophylactic effect.
PRACTCE-NEw YoRK-PowER OF DEFENDA'T TO BRING IN OTHER DE-
FENDANTS ON MoTIoN-JoINT ToRT-FEASORS.-Section 193 (2) of the New
York Civil Practice Act permits a third party to be brought in as co-de-
fendant, upon motion by a defendant, where such party is or will be re-
sponsible wholly or in part to the original defendant for the claim against
the latter in the action. Section 211-a of the act, passed subsequent to §
193 (2), provides that where, in an action for personal injuries, a money
judgment has been recovered jointly against two or more defendants, each
defendant who has paid more than his pro rata share may recover contri-
bution from the other defendants. In a suit for personal injuries resulting
from an automobile collision, the defendant, relying on these two sections,
moved to bring in two additional defendants. Held, that the motion be
denied, on the ground that § 211-a did not alter the pre-existing construction
of § 193 (2) denying permission to bring in a joint tort-feasor. Rowe v.
Denler, 238 N. Y. Supp. 9 (Sup. Ct. 1929).
The purpose of § 193 (2) of the New York Civil Practice Act was to
make possible a complete determination of the controversy before the court
by the freer addition of new parties when the court deemed it necessary.
See Zauderer v. Market St. and L. B. Realty Corp., 128 Misc. 364, 365, 218
N. Y. Supp. 669, 670 (Sup. Ct. 1926); Rothschild, Simplification of Civil
Practice in New York (1923) 23 CoL. L. REv. 618, 631; cf. ENG. PEAC.
RULS, Order XVI, rule 48. The tendency of the New York courts has
been to construe this section narrowly. See Rothschild, op. cit. supra;
Rothschild, Simplification of Civil Practice III, IV (1924) 24 COL. L. REV.
732, 864; CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) 284; (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 712.
Under the common law rule there was no right to contribution between
joint tort-feasors. Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 T. R. 186 (1799). And on
this theory the New York court has refused to permit a defendant taxicab
company to bring in a street car company in an action for injuries result-
ing from a collision in which both trolley and taxi were at fault. Green-
house v. Rochester Taxicab Co., 218 App. Div. 224, 218 N. Y. Supp. 167
(4th Dep't 1926). Contra: Fisher v. Bullock, 204 App. Div. 523, 198 N. Y.
Supp. 538 (4th Dep't 1923); (1929) 29 COL. L. REv. 630; (1924) 33 YALD
L. J. 213. But the common law rule has generally been whittled away to
allow contribution where the negligence of the defendant seedng contribu-
tion is "technical" merely, as where a master is held for his servants neg-
ligence or a town for the wrong of a contractor. Waterbury v. Waterbury
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Traction Co., 74 Conn. 152, 50 Atl. 3 (1901) ; Public Service Ry. Co. v. Mat-
teucci, 140 Atl. 442 (N. J. 1928); Note (1925) 38 A. L. R. 566; (1928) 27
MIcH. L. REV. 110; (1929) 29 COL. L. REv. 679. The application of § 193
has been correspondingly extended to these situations. Hailfinger v. Meyer,
215 App. Div. 35, 212 N. Y. Supp. 746 (4th Dep't 1925) (owner allowed
to bring in independent contractor); Fedden v. Brooklyn Eastern Dist. Ter-
minal, 204 App. Div. 741, 199 N. Y. Supp. 9 (2d Dep't 1923) (employer al-
lowed to bring in employee). Section 211-a seems to be an effort to engraft
on the law relative to joint tort-feasors a rule of distribution of damages
among wrongdoers analogous to the admiralty doctrine. Under the present
decision, however, the right to contribution intended to be bestowed on a
defendant in a suit for personal injuries arising from a tort jointly com-
mitted is made to depend entirely upon the choice of the plaintiff in naming
the parties. Cf. Mitchell v. Raymond, 181 Wis. 591, 195 N. W. 855 (1923);
(1924) 22 MICH. L. REV. 828.
REAL PROPERTY-ALIENATION OF POSSIBILITY OF REVRTER.-The owner of
a farm conveyed a sixteen-rod portion to a school district "so long as said
district shall occupy the same for school purposes and no longer." After
abandonment by the school district, the son and heir of the original grantor
gave a quitclaim deed to that portion of the farm to the assignors of the
defendant. Before the abandonment the original grantor had conveyed the
whole farm by warranty deed, but without specific mention of the school
tracts, to the assignor of the plaintiff. A statute provided: "When, after
an estate in real estate has been created by grant or devise upon express
condition, the reversion shall, before breach of such conditi6n, become vested
in any person other than the grantor or his heirs, such person shall, on
breach of such condition, have the same right of entry . . . and the same
remedy for such breach . .. as the original grantor.., would have, if still
owning such reversion." [CONN. GEN. STAT. (1918) § 5111] The plaintiff
brought suit to quiet his title to the sixteen-rod portion. The lower court
gave judgment for the defendant. Held, on appeal, that the reversionary
interest of a grantor of a "base, determinable, or qualified fee," arising
from a limitation, is sufficiently like that of a grantor on a condition sub-
sequent to bring it within the scope of the above statute providing for the
alienability of the latter. Judgment reversed. Battistone v. Banulski, 147
Atl. 820 (Conn. 1929).
Determinable fees have been firmly established in the courts of this
country, despite strong arguments based on the statute Quia Emptores and
the rule against perpetuities that they are invalid. First Universalist So-
ciety v. Boland, 155 Mass. 171, 29 N. E. 524 (1892); Loomis v. Heublein,
91 Conn. 146, 99 Atl. 483 (1916); Powell, Determinable Fees (1923) 23
COL. L. REV. 207; Vance, Rights of Reverter and the Statute Quia Emptores
(1927) 36 YALE L. J. 593. And most courts have taken the further step of
holding the "possibility of reverter" subject to release to the grantees by
the grantor or his heirs. Trustees of Calvary Presbyterian Church v. Put-
nam, 221 App. Div. 502, 224 N. Y. Supp. 651 (4th Dep't 1927), aff'd, 249
N. Y. 111, 162 N. E. 601 (1928); Sharpe v. North Carolina R. R., 190 N. C.
350, 129 S. E. 826 (1925). But, in the absence of statute this reversionary
interest cannot be assigned to a stranger. North v. Graham, 235 Ill. 178,
85 N. E. 267 (1908) ; Fractional School District 1. Beardslee, 248 Mich. 112,
226 N. W. 867 (1929) ; (1928) 13 MINN. L. REV. 271 (discussing forfeiture
upon attempted alienation). But cf. Irby v. Smith, 147 Ga. 329, 93 S. E.
877 (1917); Robinson v. Jacobs, 113 Tex. 231, 254 S. W. 309 (1923). Ex-
planation of this has been said to lie in the policy against maintenance and
a desire to insure execution of the grantor's plans. (1927) 37 YALE L. J.
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530. On the other hand, there is a modern policy of upholding varied es-
tates in land and allowing greater freedom of alienation, as is evidenced
by the statute in question and similar statutes in other states. But it is
difficult to find direct support for the application of such a statute to the
specific "possibility of reverter" situation. Cf. Johnston v. City of Los An-
geles, 176 Cal. 479, 168 Pac. 1047 (1917); Kentucky Coal Lands Co. v. Min-
eral Development Co., 295 Fed. 255 (C. C. A. 6th, 1924). The fact, however,
that the reversionary interest under this type of deed vests at once on the
occurrence of the event by which it is limited would seem to give it a more
alienable character than the right of re-entry under a deed with condition
subsequent. And it might also be argued that the slight distinction between
these two estates, found only in the usual technical words used to create
them, should not keep the former outside the operation of the statute.
REAL PROPERTY-COVENANTS RUNNING WITH THE LAND--REQUInEAENT
THAT BOTH BENEFIT AND BURDEN BE APPURTENANT.-In a deed of convey-
ance of certain church realty, the grantee covenanted "to keep the tower
clock in its present position.., or to erect it in some other public and con-
spicuous place in Charlestown." The grantor held no other land in the
vicinity. Later, the grantee contracted to convey this realty to the plain-
tiff, free from all encumbrances except two leases. In a suit to recover
money paid under this agreement, on the ground that the provision in the
defendant's deed prevented him from conveying clear title, the lower court
found for the defendant. Held, on appeal, that the judgment be affirmed.
Orenberg v. Horan, 168 N. E. 794 (Mass. 1929).
It is generally said that a covenant cannot "run with the land" unless
both the burden and the benefit of the covenant are appurtenant to the land.
Congleton v. Pattison, 10 East 130 (1808) ; Fornnby v. Barkcr, [1903] 2 Ch.
539; Werner v. Graham, 181 Cal. 174, 183 Pac. 945 (1919). Contra: Smith
v. Gulf Refining Co., 162 Ga. 191, 134 S. E. 446 (192G) ; Van Sant v. Rose,
260 fI. 401, 103 N. E. 194 (1913); Bald Eagle Valley Ry. v. Nittany Val-
ley Ry., 171 Pa. 284, 33 Atl. 239 (1895). This rule has been criticized not
only for its apparent failure to distinguish between the covenant as a
whole and its two component factors, either of which might logically run
separately with a dominant or servient tenement, but also for the potential
inequity inherent in such a broad rule of law. CLARE[, REAL COVENANTS
AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH "RUN WITH LAND" (1929) 80 et seq.; Stone,
The Equitable Rights and Liabilities of Strangers to a Contract (1918) 18
COL. L. REv. 291, 313. In the instant case, the court might have based its
decision on the absence of intent that the burden should run as perhaps evi-
denced by its alternative nature, or on a finding that it did not "touch and
concern" the land. Cf. Shade v. O'Keeffe, 156 N. E. 867 (Mass. 1927). But
in resting its decision squarely on the absence of a dominant tenement, the
court chose to follow a long line of Massachusetts cases in harmony with
the general rule. Cf. Lincoln v,. Burrage, 177 Mass. 378, 59 N. E. 67 (1901) ;
also cases cited in instant case, supra at 795. But see Savage v. Mason, 3
Cush. 500, 505 (Mass. 1849). It has been suggested that the rule in Massa-
chusetts is merely a necessary corollary of that state's doctrine of "sub-
stituted privity," a doctrine dedicated to the restriction of land encum-
brances. CLARK, op. cit. supra at 88, 109 et seq. The facts of the instant
case indicate that the same purpose, namely, the facilitating of real estate
transactions, creates a practical justification for the general rule requiring"
complete appurtenance in "running" covenants, in spite of any logical in-
consistencies and of the confusing nature of the historical concepts in-
volved. Cf. (1914) 27 HARV. L. REv. 493; Note (1914) 9 ILL.'L. REv. 58.
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REAL PROPERTY-EsTATE BY THE ENTIRETY-EFFECT OF ABSOLUTE Di-
VoRCE.-The deceased and his wife held certain real estate as tenants by
the entirety. The wife obtained an absolute divorce and survived her former
husband. Upon the petition of the executrices of his estate, the probate
court held that the entire title to the premises vested in the wife by sur-
vivorship and decreed that the property be stricken from the inventory of
the deceased's estate. Held, upon appeal by Ri creditor of the estate, that
the judgment be reversed and that an undivided one-half interest in the
property be included in the assets of the estate. Stewart v. Bleau's Estate,
147 Atl. 692 (Vt. 1929).
A deed of conveyance to a husband and wife creates in them an estate
by the entirety by which each is seized of the whole and not of a moiety,
the survivor taking the entire estate. Voight v. Voight, 252 Mass. 582, 147
N. E. 887 (1925); 1 TiFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) § 194. This
tenure is based not upon a joint tenancy but upon the common law concep-
tion of the unity of husband and wife by which two persons are deemed to
hold a single estate as one. See Steltz 1. Shreck, 128 N. Y. 263, '267, 28 N.
E. 510, 511 (1891). Thus a conveyance to two persons as husband and
wife whose marriage is in fact legally void does not vest in them an estate
by the entirety since there was never the requisite unity. Morris v. Mc-
Carty, 158 Mass. 11, 32 N. E. 938 (1893) ; Bambauer v. Schleider, 176 App.
Div. 562, 163 N. Y. Supp. 186 (2d Dep't 1917). Where a conveyance has
been made during the existence of a valid marriage, the resulting tenancy
by the entirety is in no way affected by a subsequent divorce a mcnsa et
tho'ro, since such a divorce does not dissolve the marriage relation. Free-
man v. Belfer, 173 N. C. 581, 92 S. E. 486 (1917). It has likewise been held
in a few states that a termination of the marriage by an absolute divorce
does not affect a tenancy by the entirety, on the theory that the right of
survivorship was vested by the conveyance. In re Lewis, 85 Mich. 340, 48
N. W. 580 (1891) (statute now provides that tenants by the entirety shall
hold as tenants in common after a divorce. MICH. ComP. LAWS (Cahill,
1915) § 11437) ; Alles v. Lyon, 216 Pa. 604, 66 Atl. 81 (1907); O'Malley v.
O'Malley, 78 Pa. Super. 10, 116 Atl. 500 (1921). But the majority of courts
hold, as in the instant case, that when the legal unity between husband and
wife is broken by an absolute divorce, there is nothing upon which a ten-
ancy by the entirety can rest and it is converted into a tenancy in common.
Steltz v. Shreok, supra; Bernatavicius v. Bernatavicius, 259 Mass. 486, 166
N. E. 685 (1927); Note (1928) 52 A. L. R. 890. That a tenancy in com-
mon is held to be created rather than a joint tenancy is probably due to
the present statutory and judicial disfavor of the latter tenure. See Sbar-
bore v. Sbarboro, 88 N. J. Eq. 101, 102, 102 Atl. 256 (1917). But cf. Lash
v. Lash, 58 Ind. 526 (1877) (where conveyance was to husband and wife
"as joint tenants (survivor taking the whole)," divorce held to convert ten-
ancy by the entirety into joint tenancy). When one spouse has conveyed
his interest to a third person, it has been held that a subsequent divorce
will not make the grantee and the other spouse tenants in common, but the
grantee will stand in the same relation to the land as the grantor did prior
to the divorce. Whitely v. Meador, 137 Tenn. 163, 192 S. W. 718 (1917)
(wife, surviving her divorced husband, became absolute owner of whole
estate by survivorship). On the other hand, the purchaser of one spouse's
right of survivorship without knowledge of a prior divorce will take only
an undivided half interest. Melchers v. Bertolido, 118 Misc. 196, 192 N. Y.
Supp. 781 (Sup. Ct. 1922). The simplification of the legal and personal re-
lations which the more flexible tenure of tenancy in common effects doubt-
less justifies the somewhat arbitrary character of the rule of the instant
case. By attaching to the right of survivorship the incident of defeasabil-
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ity upon termination of the marriage relationship by divorce, the courts
have adapted to modern social conditions the law of tenancy by the entirety,
developed when divorce was unknown. See Note (1930) 78 U. of PA. L.
REv. 656.
SPscIFIc PERFoRANc--CoNTRALc Fo SALE OF LAND--IGHT OF As-
SIGNEE OF VENDEE.-The defendant agreed to sell certain real estate to A.
The contract provided for a partial cash payment and the execution of a
purchase-money bond and mortgage. A assigned the contract to the plain-
tiff who subsequently brought suit for specific performance, tendering his
own bond and mortgage. The lower court held invalid the defense that the
plaintiff had failed to tender a bond and mortgage executed by A and gave
judgment for the plaintiff. Held, on appeal, that the defendant could not
be required to accept the financial responsibility of the plaintiff in place of
the responsibility of A for which he had contracted. Judgment reversed.
Lozo Realty Co. Inc. v. Estate of Isaac G. Johnson, 237 N. Y. Supp. 4C0
(App. Div. 1st Dep't 1929).
Where the vendor sues the assignee of the vendee for specific perform-
ance of a contract for the sale of land, a proper consideration is whether
the assignee has assumed the vendee's duty of performance. Langel v.
Betz, 250 N. Y. 159, 164 N. E. 890 (1928) ; H. & H. Corp. v. Broad Holding
Corp., 204 App. Div. 569, 198 N. Y. Supp. 763 (2d Dep't 1923); (1929) 38
YALE L. J. 1155. But even where the suit is brought by the assignee, sev-
eral cases have conditioned such equitable relief upon "mutuality of obliga-
tion and remedy," i.e., the vendor, not being in a position where he can suc-
ceed in an action for specific performance against the assignee, is not liable
in an action for specific performance brought by the assignee. Genevetz v.
Feie -ing, 136 App. Div. 736, 121 N. Y. Supp. 392 (2d Dep't 1910) ; Schuyler
v. Kirk-Broun Realty Co., 193 App. Div. 269, 184 N. Y. Supp. 95 (4th Dep't
1920), overruled by Epstein v. Gluckin, 233 N. Y. 490, 135.N. E. 861
(1922); see (1923) 32 YALE L. J. 831. The general view, however, would
seem to be that specific performance will be decreed wherever the assignee
has tendered full performance of the vendee's obligation. Cashman v. Bean,
226 Mass. 198, 115 N. E. 574 (1917); Epstein v. Glucmn, stpra. Where
the agreement may be interpreted as contemplating that the vendee's per-
sonal credit be pledged as part of the consideration, the assignee of the
vendee may not compel specific performance upon offering his own credit in
place of that of the vendee. Thus, where the contract requires the vendee
to deliver his own notes for deferred payments of the purchase price, his
assignee can not compel the vendor to accept a substitution of the assignee's
personal responsibility. Rice v. Gibbs, 40 Neb. 264, 58 N. W. 724 (1894);
Seacoast Development Co. v. Beringer, 134 AtI. 770 (N. J. 1926). And the
same result has been reached where, as in the instant case, a bond and
purchase money mortgage is contracted for. Kut.schinski v. Thompson, 101
N. J. Eq. 649, 138 At. 569 (1927); (1928) 28 CoL. L. lizv. 384. Contra:
Montgomery v. Do Picot, 153 Cal. 509, 96 Paec. 305 (1908). An analogous
situation exists where the contract is for the sale of the equity of redemption
and the vendee is to assume an existing mortgage. Since; as is generally
held, the agreement of sale is superseded by the deed of conveyance, £o that
no action could be maintained on the contract against the vendee for the
responsibility contemplated by the original contract, a decree of specific
performance in favor of the assignee will be denied. DobMn V. Lav 7dborg.




STRIKES-INJUNCTIONS-"SECONDARY" STRIKEs.-Twenty-eight dealers in
building materials sued the officers of various bricklayers' and carpenters'
unions to restrain their attempts to unionize the plaintiffs' establishments.
The method employed by the defendants was to call strikes of all trades
on building operations to which the plaintiffs made deliveries, even though
many of the striking artisans did not actually handle the commodity de-
livered by a plaintiff. Held, that the "primary purpose" of the defendants
was to injure the business of the plaintiffs in order to compel them to union-
ize their establishments, and that such "illegal" activities should be per-
manently restrained. Willson & Adams Co. v. Pearce, 237 N. Y. Supp. 601
(Sup. Ct. 1929).
There appear to be at least four distinct situations arising out of em-
ployer-employee disputes. The most usual type involves a strike by em-
ployees against their employer in order to obtain better wages, shorter
hours, or other changes in working conditions. The privilege of union
members to do this is universally conceded and such action will not be re-
strained. American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Council, 257 U. S. 184, 42
Sup. Ct. 72 (1921); Saulsberry v. Cooper's Internat'l Union, 147 Ky. 170,
143 S. W. 1018 (1912) ; Illinois Iron Co. v. Michalek, 279 Ill. 221, 116 N. E.
714 (1917). A second type includes the so-called "secondary" strike such
as that in the instant case. The decisions in this field are made to depend
upon a distinction between strikes with a "primary purpose" of injuring
non-union employers, and strikes the "chief aim" of which is to better the
conditions of striking union members. Many courts say that when union
members refuse to work upon material furnished by non-union establish-
ments their "primary purpose" is to injure such establishments, and such
courts accordingly enjoin the strike. Purvis v. United Brotherhood, 214 Pa.
348, 63 Atl. 585 (1906); Lohse Co. v. Fuelle, 215 Mo. 421, 114 S. W. 997
(1908); Burnham v. Dowd, 217 Mass. 351, 104 N. E. 841 (1914). Others
recognize the obvious fact that in refusing to work on non-union materials
a union is only refusing to aid in destroying itself, and decline to issue an
injunction. Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal, 244 U. S. 459, 37 Sup. Ct. 718
(1916); Gill Engravin# Co. v. Doerr, 214 Fed. 111 (S. D. N. Y. 1914);
Cohn & Rath Co. v. Bricklayers, 92 Conn. 161, 101 Atl. 659 (1917); Grant
Co. v. Building Trades, 136 Minn. 167, 161 N. W. 520 (1917); Bogscrt v.
Dhuy, 221 N. Y. 342, 117 N. E. 582 (1917). A third situation involves the
"primary" boycott, in which union members refuse to patronize a particular
establishment and persuade others not do so. If the result is an undue re-
straint of interstate commerce, the boycott will be enjoined under the Sher-
man Act. Lawlor v. Loewe, 235 U. S. 522, 35 Sup. Ct. 170 (1915). Most
state courts, however, will not enjoin such a boycott. Lindsay v. Montana
Federation of Labor, 37 Mont. 264, 96 Pac. 127 (1908); Illinois Iron Co. v.
Michalek, supra. Contra: Auburn Draying Co. v. Wardell, 227 N. Y. 1,
124 N. E. 97 (1919). In a fourth group fall acts constituting a "secondary"
boycott, in which union members not only refuse to patronize certain estab-
lishments, but in addition employ similar methods against third parties
who continue to patronize the boycotted institution. In some of these cases
injunctions are granted. American Federation of Labor v. Bucks Stove Co.,
33 App. D. C. 83 (1909). Contra: Pierce v. Stablemen's Union, 156 Cal.
90, 103 Pac. 324 (1909)'; Lindsay v. Montana Federation of Labor, supra.
The court in the instant case seems to have mistaken the New York prece-
dents when it followed Auburn Draying Co. v. Wardell, supra, rather than
Bossert v. Dhuy, supra; for, in framing the injunction in the former case,
the court specifically pointed out that the restraint was not directed at the
refusal of the defendants to be employed by the plaintiff or its patrons until
the plaintiff unionized its shop, but at the defendants' attempts to persuade
the entire community to abstain from doing business with the plaintiff.
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An injunction has been denied on facts similar to those of the instant case.
Reardon v. Caton, 189 App. Div. 501, 178 N. Y. Supp. 713 (2d Dep't 1919).
TRUSTS--NECESSARY PARTIES PLAINTIFF IN SUIT BY BUSINFSS Tnusr.-
The plaintiff, a business trust doing business under the name of H. Kemp-
ner, brought suit in the name of "H. Kempner, a trust company," to collect
two notes payable to H. Kempner. The lower court directed a verdict for the
defendant because of insufficient proof of the identity of the plaintiff. Held,
on appeal, that the judgment be affirmed, on the ground that suit could not
be brought in the firm name since the title to the notes was in the "Trustees
of H. Kempner." H. Kempner v. Welker, 283 Pac. 284 (Ariz. 1929).
The propriety of a suit by a business trust in the firm name has been
effected in a few states by statutes. Thus, a statute authorizing the trustees
of an express trust "to carry on any lawful business" and "to do any lawful
act which any individual might do" has been construed as permitting a
business trust to sue for breach of contract in the firm name. General
American Oil Co. v. Wagoner Oil & Gas Co., 118 Okla. 183, 247 Pac. 99
(1926); Okla. Laws 1919, c. 16, § 1. And a business trust has been per-
mitted to sue in the firm name for breach of contract as an "unincorporated
association" within the meaning of a statute providing that "any unincor-
porated joint stock company or association ... may sue or be sued in its
company or distinguishing name." Graham v,. Omar Gasoline Co., 253 S.
W. 896 (Tex. 1923); TEx. Rav. CIv. STAT. (1925) art. 6133. But in the
absence of statutes, no case has been found permitting suit in the firm
name, and some courts have declared that suit in the firm name is improper.
See Hull v. Newhall, 244 Mass. 207, 209, 138 N. E. 249, 250 (1923) (lease
executed by the trustees without designation of trust capacity or mention
of firm name); Denny v. Cascade Platinum Co., 133 Wash. 436, 440, 2,32
Pac. 409, 410 (1925). Suit in the name of the trustees, however, is usually
permitted. Simson v. Klipstein, 262 Fed. 823 (D. N. J. 1920); Wesson v.
Galef, 286 Fed. 621 (S. D. N. Y. 1922) ; Hull v NewLll; Denny v. Cascado
Platinum Co., both supra. Contra: Willey v. W. J. Hoggson Corp., 90 Fla.
343, 106 So. 408 (1925) (all cestuis necessary parties plaintiff). In de-
termining the proper parties plaintiff, the courts have rested their decisions
on a consideration of the nature of the organization, i.e., "partnership" or
"trust," as evidenced by the degree of control retained by the cestuis. Cf.
Simson v. Klipstein; Willey v. W. J. Hoggson Corp., both supra. A possible
alternative basis for decision might be found in the nature of the action
and the identity of the persons to whom the firm name might be said to
belong. Where the action is one of tort, the trustees are generally per-
mitted to sue, on the ground that they are the holders of the legal title to
the trust property. Denny v,. Cascadc Platintan Co., supra (suit to quiet
title to trust realty) ; Wesson 'v. Galef, supra (suit to enjoin threatened
tort). But in a contract action factors other than the legal title to the
trust property would appear worthy of consideration. Where the contract
is executed in the names of the trustees without mention of the firm name,
it would seem clear that the trustees are the only proper parties plaintiff.
Hull v. Newhall supra. But in an action on a contract executed in the
firm name it might be reasonable to require that suit be brought in the
names of those persons to whom the firm name may be said to belong. Thus,
where the firm name belongs solely to the trustees, as where the trust in-
strument adopting the firm name was executed by the trustees alone, and
shares were subsequently sold to the cestuis, the trustees would appear to
be the proper parties plaintiff. Cf. Simson r. Klipstcin, supra. But if the
firm name belongs to the association as a whole, as where the trustees and
cestuis join in the execution of the trust instrument adopting the firm name,
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it would appear to be proper to require that the cestuis be joined as parties
plaintiff. Cf. Willey v. W. J. Hoggson, supra. While this procedure, if
adopted, might appear to be cumbersome where the cestuis are very num-
erous, such an effect may be avoided under statutes permitting suit in
the names of one or more parties as the representatives of all. N. Y. Civu.
PRACTICE ACT (Cahill, 5th ed. 1928) § 195; OHIo GEN. CODE (1926) § 11257.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER-EFFECT OF CONDEMNATION ON EXECUTORY CON-
TRACT TO BUY LAND.-The plaintiff contracted to buy a lot, sixty by one
hundred feet, from the defendant. Between the dates of contracting and
closing title, a strip 3% feet wide vested in the city by condemnation. On
the closing day, the plaintiff rejected a conveyance and brought an action
to recover the amount of his deposit and expenses. The lower court dis-
missed the complaint. Held, on appeal, that the judgment be affirmed.
Reife v. Osmers, 252 N. Y. 320, 169 N. E. 399 (1929).
When the vendor under an executory contract for the sale of land is
unable to comply with his contract to invest the purchaser with merchant-
able title, the purchaser is entitled to a return of the payments made by
him. Anderson v. Security Land Co., 224 N. W. 937 (S. D. 1929); Bash-
ford v. West Miami Land Co., 295 Pa. 560, 145 Atl. 678 (1928); Reese v.
Levin, 123 So. 809 (Fla. 1929). An outstanding property or transfer tax
lien renders the vendor's title unmerchantable. Crutcher v. Aiken, 252 S.
W. 844 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923) ; Warner v. Doscher, 213 App. Div. 117, 21&1
N. Y. Supp. 83 (1st Dep't 1925), aff'd, 241 N. Y. 6051 150 N. E. 574 (1926);
Midurburn Realty Corp. v. F. Dee & L. Realty Corp., 247 N. Y. 307, 160 N.
E. 380 (1928); cf. Hartman v. Church Const. Co., 101 N. J. Eq. 512, 139 Ati.
484 (1927). And a restriction upon the use of the property not mentioned
in the contract to convey justifies rejection of title by the purchaser. Bulk-
ley v. Rouken, Glen Inc., 222 App. Div. 570, 226 N. Y. Supp. 544 (2d Dep't
1928). Similarly, the pendency of padlock proceedings under the National
Prohibition Act has been held to be a cloud on title. Goldstein v. Ehrlick,
96 N. J. Eq. 52, 124 Atl. 761 (1924). And the pendency of condemnation
proceedings has been held to constitute a defect in title justifying a recov-
ery by the purchaser of money already paid. Hunt v. Inner Harbor Land
Co., 61 Cal. App. 271, 214 Pac. 998 (1923); Miller v. Calvin Philips & Co.,
44 Wash. 226, 87 Pac. 264 (1906); Hartman v. Church Const. Co., supra
(pendency of condemnation proceedings together with a lien for unpaid
taxes rendered vendor's title defective). In the Hunt and Miller cases, the
condemnation proceedings were pending, so that a denial of relief would
have compelled the purchaser to buy up a lawsuit, and there was no cer-
tainty as to the amount of property to be taken, whereas in the instant
case the land had already been condemned. Cf. Summers v. Midland Co.,
167 Minn. 453, 209 N. W. 323 (1926) (holding that a restrictive easement
acquired by condemnation proceedings subsequent to a contract for a deed
did not entitle purchaser to rescind and recover the amount already paid) ;
(1927) '25 MICE. L. REv. 297. The unsubstantiality of the strip taken
furnishes further justification for the result of the instant case especially
in view of the fact that the plaintiff as purchaser has an equitable interest
entitling him to share in the condemnation award. Cf. Rappoport v.
Crawford, 99 N. J. Eq. 669, 134 At]. 120 (1926); Clarke v. Long Island
Realty Co., 126 App. Div. 282, 110 N. Y. Supp. 697 (2d Dep't 1908).
WILLS-PROBATE-POWER TO PROBATE DOCUMENT ALREADY PROBATED IN
ANOTHER STATE.A petition by one executor-trustee of a will for probate
in New York was combined with a petition by the co-executor-trustee for
ancillary letters upon the same will, which had already been probated in
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California. The testator died in California. The executor seeking original
probate was a New York trust company which could not, under California
statutes, act as executor-trustee in that state. The co-executor, alleging
that the testator was domiciled in California, had obtained probate in that
state, and declined the proffered assistance of the Trust company. Hcld,
that the testator was in fact domiciled in New York at the time of his
death; that the petition for probate should be granted and that for ancillary
letters denied. In re Beban'7s Estate, 135 Misc. 25, 237 N. Y. Supp. (Sur.
Ct. 1929).
It is generally agreed that the state in which the testator's property is
situated has jurisdiction over that property and power to grant original
probate. Parnell v. Thompson, 81 Kan. 119, 105 Pac. 502 (1909); 1 Pum,
WILLS (2d ed. 1926) § 529. But probate is actually operative to convey
title to beneficiaries under the will only as to property within the state of
probate. Schweitzer v. Bean, 154 Ark. 225, 242 S. W. 63 (1922) ; Ferriday
v. Grosvenor, 86 Conn. 698, 86 Atl. 569 (1913); Solis v. Williamns, 205 Mass.
350, 91 N. E. 148 (1910); Foster v. Jordan, 130 Ky. 445, 113 S. W. 490
(1908). Obviously, the state in which property is situated at the death
of the testator may give full effect to the decrees of the court of the
testator's domicile. Cf. Grignon v,. Shope, 100 Ore. 011, 197 Pac. 317
(1921); Pratt v. Hawley, 297 Ill. 244, 130 N. E. 793 (1921). And if the
desirable end of one effectual probate is to be attained, the only probate
which has any chance for general recognition is the probate at the testator's
domicile. 1 PAGE, op. cit. supra § 649. It has been said that, under the
full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution, a judgment of orig-
inal probate is conclusive in proceedings of ancillary probate if the first
court had jurisdiction of the, subject-matter. See In Tre Coppock's Estate,
72 Mont. 431, 434, 234 Pac. 258, 259 (1925). But it would seem that such
a court could never have "jurisdiction" as to property outside the state.
Selle v. Repp, 143 Ark. 192, 220 S. W. 662 (1920) ; Kirdland v. Calhoun, 147
Tenn. 388, 248 S. W. 302 (1923); Waudrille v. Pizzati, 119 Miss. 442, 81
So. 127 (1919). At any rate, "domicile" is generally regarded as a juris-
dictional fact, and the decision of one state that the testator was domiciled
there is not binding on any other state, even under the full faith and credit
clause. Burbankv . Ernst, 232 U. S. 162, 34 Sup. Ct. 229 (1914). In the
Burbank case, a dictum by the Supreme Court indicated that, had there
been no evidence whatever to defeat the domicile claim of the court of orig-
inal probate, the second court, upon petition for ancillary papers, would
have been bound by the first decree. But in no case has a federal court
actually held the evidence to be so one-sided, and state courts regularly
determine the question of domicile for themselves. Green v. Moore, 206 Ky.
724, 268 S. W. 337 (1925); Re Clark, 148 Cal. 108, 82 Pac. 760 (1905).
The policy in New York has been to accept the decree of the foreign state
where no question of the propriety of the first action is raised; but where,
as in the instant case, undue haste indicates lack of good faith on the part
of the party offering the will for probate, the court will inquire into the
will as in an original proceeding. Cf. In Matter of Harrima's Estate, 124
Misc. 320, 208 N. Y. Supp. 672 (Surr. Ct. 1924) ; Matter of Wenutorth, 230
N. Y. 176, 129 N. E. 646 (1920).
WORKMEN'S COIPENSATION-MAIWIAGE-RIGHT OF COMMON-L&W WIrE.-
The plaintiff brought suit for compensation under a statute providing for
compensation to the "widow" of a deceased workman. [PA. STAT. (West.
1920) § 21999] No statutory marriage was proved but proof was offered
of capacity to marry, a contract of present marriage and cohabitation as
husband and wife. The lower court awarded compensation to the plaintiff
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as a common law wife. Held, on appeal, that the judgment be affirmed.
Brown v. James F. Nolen & Sons, 148 AtI. 498 (Pa. 1930).
Compensation statutes providing compensation for the "wife" or "widow"
are generally interpreted to require a legal marriage and the right of a
common law wife to compensation depends upon the recognition afforded
such a relationship in the particular jurisdiction. See Menton v. State In-
dustrial Ins. Dep't, 104 Wash. 652, 655, 177 Pac. 696, 698 (1919). Such
marriages are considered legal in the majority of states TIFFANY, DOMES-
TIC RELATIONS (3d ed. 1921) 40. And in such states recovery by a com-
mon law wife is permitted. Woodward Iron Co. v. Bradford, 206 Ala, 447,
90 So. 803 (1921). But a recovery has been denied where, by statute, all
marriages not complying with the statutory formalities are declared void.
Menton v. State Industrial Ins. Dep't, supra; cf. Memphis Fertilizer Co. v.
Small, 22 S. W. (2d) 1037 (Tenn. 1930). But under a statute not limiting
dependents to members of specified classes but including also one "in good
faith a member of the family or household of such workman," a common
law wife has been awarded compensation even in a state where the legality
of a common law marriage is not recognized. Temescal Rock Co. v. Industrial
Accident Comm., 180 Cal. 637, 182 Pac. 447 (1919); CAL. CONS. SUPP.
(Deering, 1919) act 2143c, § 14. But cf. Armstrong v. Industrial Comm.,
161 Wis. 530, 154 N. W. 844 (1915). Where the celebration of an attempted
formal marriage is void because of the incompetency of one of the parties,
there is a conflict whether continued cohabitation after the removal of the
impediment is sufficient to establish a valid common law marriage with-
out proof of a new contract of marriage. The majority'of courts do not
require a new contract where the marriage was contracted in good faith
without knowledge of the impediment by the one seeking to establish the
marriage. Land v. Land, 206 Ill. 288, 68 N. E. 1109 (1903) ; Sims v. Sims,
122 Miss. 745, 85 So. 73 (1920). But many courts require proof of a new
contract where there was knowledge of the impediment. McConnell v. Mc-
Connell, 211 Mich. 483, 179 N. W. 33 (1920). So compensation has been
awarded to a claimant who in good faith married the deceased before his
divorce decree became final and lived with him till his death. Woodward
Iron Co. v. Bradford, supra; Jones v. Powell Lumber Co., 156 La. 767, 101
So. 135 (1924). Contra: Armstrong v. Industrial Comm., supra. But
where the claimant was aware of the impediment, as where she formally
married the deceased within the prohibited period after her own divorce,
but continued to cohabit after the impediment was removed, compensation
has been denied. Hall v. Industrial Comm., 165 Wis. 364, 162 N. W. 312
(1917) (not "legal" wife) ; Sanders v. Industrial Comm., 64 Utah 372, 230
Pac. 1026 (1924) (not "in good faith a member of family"). It is sub-
mitted that, at least, for purposes of awarding compensation, continued
cohabitation after the removal of the impediment should be sufficient to
establish a common law marriage where the claimant was ignorant of the
impediment. And even where the claimant had knowledge, the fact of con-
tinued cohabitation, added to evidence of an intent to create a licit relation-
ship, should be sufficient to justify an award of compensation. See (1926) 26
COL. L. REV. 487.
